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By incorporating David Lewis’ conditional analysis (LCA), Vihvelin’s LCA-PROP in-
herits some of its problems.
Recall:
LCA — x is disposed at time t to give response R to stimulus S iff, for some 
intrinsic property B that x has at t, for some time t′ after t, if x were to un-
dergo stimulus S at time t and retain property B until time t′, S and x’s hav-
ing of B would jointly be an x-complete cause of x’s giving response R.
Vihvelin amends this by adding “for some suitable proportion of the test cases” to 
deal with problematic masking cases, resulting in:
LCA-PROP — x is disposed at time t to give response R to stimulus S iff, for 
some intrinsic property B that x has at t, for some time t′ after t, and for some 
suitable proportion of test-cases, if x were in a test-case at t and retained prop-
erty B until time t′, S and x’s having of B would be an x-complete cause of 
x’s giving response R.
I have three issues with LCA that apply equally to LCA-PROP.
The first is perhaps a trivial issue regarding a lack of clarity of the analysis, though 
it may amount to something more significant, depending on the clarification. It con-
cerns the phrase “x-complete cause.” According to the analysis: “S and x’s having of 
B would jointly be an x-complete cause of x’s giving response R.” Now, what is an “x-
complete cause”? Lewis tells us that an x-complete cause of R is a complete cause of 
R, in so far as the properties of x are concerned. Likewise, in a footnote, Vihvelin ex-
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plains “A Joe-complete cause is a cause, that is complete, so far as Joe’s intrinsic prop-
erties are concerned, of Joe’s walking. “This might suggest that the x-complete cause is 
the contribution that x’s properties make to the manifestation. But look at the wording 
of the analysis. It says that the stimulus S and the base property B would jointly be an 
x-complete cause of response R. That entails that the stimulus and the base property 
would jointly be a complete cause of the manifestation as far as the properties of x are 
concerned. But what does that mean?
One way to read this is as saying that the stimulus and the causal basis are both 
properties of x. It’s plausible, and is in fact stipulated by the analysis, that the base 
property B is a property of x, but what about the stimulus? Typical stimuli, such as 
striking, dropping, and submerging in water, don’t seem like properties of x. They 
don’t even seem like properties. Even if we focus on properties that are instantiated 
by the stimulus event, it’s not clear that they would typically be properties of the dis-
posed object. Often, a disposition’s stimulus is extrinsic to the disposed object. The 
striking that stimulates the glass’s fragility is extrinsic to the glass. The striking may 
have certain properties, such as happening at a certain time, in a certain place, with a 
certain force, and the hammer is hard, made of steel, etc. But these are not properties 
of the glass. Perhaps the glass has related relational properties, such as being in a cer-
tain proximity to a steel hammer moving at a certain velocity, and so on. But if “stim-
ulus S” is supposed to refer to these relational properties of x, that is not made clear. 
Furthermore, Vihvelin’s analysis claims that the “Joe-complete cause” consists of in-
trinsic properties of Joe. If the stimulus and the base properties are a Joe-complete 
cause, then the properties that trigger Joe’s disposition must be intrinsic to Joe. In 
Vihvelin’s example, it’s something about Joe that stimulates his walking. But isn’t it 
possible for Joe to be stimulated to walk by some event extrinsic to Joe, such as some-
one saying “Hey Joe, could you come here for sec?”
Another way to read the expression ‘complete as far as the properties of x are 
concerned’ is that nothing further is needed from x to cause the manifestation. But 
what does this add to simply saying that the stimulus and the causal basis “would 
cause,” or “would be causally sufficient” for the manifestation? Perhaps it is meant 
to rule out the possibility that some property of x other than B could also contribute 
to causing the manifestation. But it’s not clear why anyone would want to rule that 
out. It means that a response can never be over-determined by multiple dispositions. 
Perhaps my conversing with people at the reception is over-determined by my be-
ing professionally ambitious and by my being sociable. The account would say that, 
in order for my sociability to count as a disposition, I must have some intrinsic prop-
erty that serves as the causal basis of my sociability, such that it alone, and none of 
my other properties, would causally contribute to my engaging in conversation at 
the reception. If this is the proper way to understand “x-complete cause,” it rules out 
the possibility over-determining dispositions by definition. Lewis is not concerned 
to make room for over-determination in his theory of causation, and on this inter-
pretation of LCA, he seems to go out of his way to rule out the possibility of over-
determination. But do we have any good reason to retain this feature of his view? I 
don’t see any.
Perhaps a more philosophically significant issue with LCA-PROP is its implica-
tion that every disposition must have a causal basis. Some philosophers argue that 
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dispositions do not necessarily have causal bases; there can be pure, ungrounded or 
‘bare’ dispositions. It’s not a conceptual truth that dispositions have causal bases. If 
scientists found a certain particle that was disposed to behave in a certain way, and 
they could not identify any property of that particle to serve as the causal basis of 
that disposition, then they might conclude that there must be a basis there, and they 
just haven’t found it yet. But if our best scientific research indicates that there is no 
“hidden variable,” then it seems reasonable to conclude that they found a disposition 
that has no causal basis. If such a scenario makes sense, the existence of a causal basis 
for every disposition is not a conceptual matter, but an empirical one.
Furthermore, it seems that the answer to the empirical question does not favor 
ubiquitous causal bases. The natures of fundamental properties, such as mass and 
charge, seem to be exhausted by their dispositionality, and further study reveals no 
deeper structure to serve as the intrinsic properties to ground these dispositions. 
LCA-PROP would seem, therefore, to be inapplicable to the most fundamental prop-
erties of the physical world.
One might argue that, if there are such cases where something has a disposition 
but has no other property that grounds the disposition, that is compatible with the 
analysis. The analysis states that when x has a disposition, there is “some intrinsic 
property B that x has at t.” It doesn’t stipulate that B must be a distinct property. It’s 
compatible with that claim that the intrinsic property is the disposition itself. A dis-
position that has no distinct causal basis could be its own causal basis.
I have some sympathy with this response. However, notice that it might fail as 
an analysis, since reference to the disposition would appear on the analysans side of 
the bi-conditional. Furthermore, if the disposition itself could be “property B” in the 
analysis, that is, if a disposition could causally contribute to its own manifestation, 
then the motivation to introduce an additional property into the analysis becomes 
unclear, and the suggestion that only the causal basis and not the disposition itself 
can be causally relevant becomes more doubtful.
The third issue I have with this analysis is its insistence that the causal basis of the 
disposition must be intrinsic to the disposed object. Dispositions are not necessarily 
intrinsic to the objects that have them, and when they are not, it’s plausible that those 
dispositions have extrinsic causal bases. Contrary to Lewis, perfect duplicates could 
differ with respect to having certain dispositions; a thing can lose or acquire disposi-
tions without changing intrinsically. Weight, for example, may be dispositional, but 
it’s not intrinsic. The weight of an object is relative to the object’s gravitational field. 
So, the causal basis of an object’s weight is not limited to the intrinsic properties of 
the object, but must also include some of its extrinsic properties, such as the object’s 
spatial relations to massive bodies.
One might object that being subject to a certain gravitational field is part of the 
circumstances of manifestation of having a certain weight, or not part of the “test-
case” for attributing that weight to something. However, this is not in accord with the 
meaning of ‘weight,’ if ordinary usage is any guide. A visit to the “Your Weight on 
Other Worlds” website amply demonstrates this. The site asks “Ever wonder what 
you might weigh on Mars or the Moon? Here’s your chance to find out.” If the test 
case for your weight included being in the Earth’s gravitational field, there would be 
no cause to wonder what you weigh on the moon.
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One might argue that the real disposition here is mass, and that is intrinsic. I’m 
not sure if such an objection means to deny that weight is a disposition, too. If it does, 
on what grounds does it do so? Perhaps the thought is that an object’s weight is de-
rived from its mass, and that mass is more fundamental. But if that’s the reason why 
weight is being dismissed as a real disposition, then Joe’s dispositions to walk and 
do math will be in trouble, for it is doubtful that they are fundamental in a way that 
weight is not. (I’m not saying Joe’s dispositions to walk and do math are extrinsically 
based, just that they are dispositions, and that the purported reason for thinking that 
weight is not a real disposition proves too much.) Furthermore, it can be argued that 
mass is extrinsically grounded as well. Theoretically, a particle has the mass that it 
does because of relations to other things in the universe, such as, perhaps, the Higgs 
field. If that’s right, then the causal basis of an object’s mass is not intrinsic to the ob-
ject itself.
But we need not delve into theoretical physics to find extrinsic dispositions. Vul-
nerability, marketability, visibility, humorousness, decipherability, and recognizabil-
ity are all dispositions a thing could gain or loose without intrinsic change. That sug-
gests that these are extrinsic dispositions, and if these dispositions have causal bases, 
they must be at least partially extrinsic to the disposed object.
To summarize, I have three objections to LCA-PROP:
1. As far as I can understand what an x-complete cause is, the analysis is mis-
taken in claiming that a disposition’s stimulus and its causal basis would 
jointly be an x-complete cause of its manifestation.
2. The analysis is mistaken if it assumes that dispositions necessarily have dis-
tinct causal bases.
3. The analysis is mistaken in assuming that the causal basis of a disposition 
must be an intrinsic property of the disposed object.
 
